Simulating Chinese Gray Zone Coercion of Taiwan
Identifying Redlines and Escalation Pathways
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This paper shares the results of an exercise hosted by the RAND Corporation to explore the risk of escalation from Chinese activities in the gray zone to conventional war. The results showed an overall low risk of Taiwanese escalation because of Chinese military power and Chinese and U.S. constraints on Taiwan's decisionmaking. The exercise's U.S. team would consider escalation to military force only if Taiwan faced an existential threat, and the Taiwan team would not escalate without U.S. support.
Further, the U.S. team was significantly more willing to intervene and provided more support when Taiwan took steps to defend itself in line with U.S. strategy. The two countries face a prisoner's dilemma in that their security strategies hinge on one another, but each side is waiting for the other to signal deeper commitment before further implementing mutually beneficial policies.
Table of Contents
Chapter One
Introduction: China's Gray Zone Challenge to Taiwan
Chapter Two
Gray Zone Scenarios
Chapter Three
Tabletop Exercise Results and Analysis
Chapter Four
Conclusions, Implications, and Recommendations
Appendix A
List of Initial Scenarios
Appendix B
Scenarios for Tabletop Exercise
Research conducted by
This research was sponsored by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD).
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