Report
Learning from Experience
Nov 16, 2011
Volume II: Lessons from the U.S. Navy's Ohio, Seawolf, and Virginia Submarine Programs
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Large, complex submarine design and construction programs demand personnel with unique skills and capabilities supplemented with practical experiences in their areas of expertise. Recognizing the importance of past experiences for successful program management, the U.S. Navy asked the RAND Corporation to develop a set of lessons learned from previous submarine programs that could help inform future program managers. This volume presents lessons from three submarine programs. The RAND team looked at how the programs were managed, the issues that affected management decisions, and the outcomes of those decisions. All three submarine programs had tenuous beginnings. Each experienced cost overruns and schedule delays in the construction of its first-of-class submarine. The Ohio and Virginia programs made corrections, and both are viewed as generally successful. Seawolf, probably due to the changing threat and budgetary environment, was terminated before changes could be made to correct early missteps. An overarching lesson from the three programs is the importance of program stability. Stability applies in many areas — funding consistency, a long-term build strategy, fixed operational requirements, program management, and an integrated partnership between the Navy and the shipbuilders.
Chapter One
Introduction
Chapter Two
U.S. Nuclear Submarines Up to Ohio
Chapter Three
Ohio Case Study
Chapter Four
Seawolf Case Study
Chapter Five
Virginia Case Study
Chapter Six
Lessons Identified
Appendix
Significant Events in the Three Programs
The research described in this report was prepared for the United States Navy, the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence, and Australia's Department of Defence. The research was conducted within the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.
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