Download

Download eBook for Free

Full Document

FormatFile SizeNotes
PDF file 8.4 MB

Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 10 or higher for the best experience.

Research Summary

FormatFile SizeNotes
PDF file 0.1 MB

Use Adobe Acrobat Reader version 10 or higher for the best experience.

Purchase

Purchase Print Copy

 FormatList Price Price
Add to Cart Paperback180 pages $39.50 $31.60 20% Web Discount

Research Questions

  1. What interests do the United States, China, and Russia have in the Middle East, and what is the potential for great-power competition there?
  2. Under what conditions could the United States expect to become involved in a conflict in the Middle East in which China, Russia, or both are also involved?
  3. What are the implications for the U.S. government, the joint force, and the Department of the Air Force in particular?

The United States is in the midst of a shift in strategic focus from countering terrorism to countering China and Russia in the Indo-Pacific and Europe. For centuries, the Middle East has served as a theater of competition between the world's great powers. Today's most prominent competitors also view the Middle East as a critical region of the world where they can cultivate access and influence. This report — part of a four-volume series — explores where and how the United States, China, and Russia are competing for influence in the Middle East; what kinds of interests they have in the region; what kinds of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic influence-seeking measures they are using; where and why competition might turn into conflict; what form that conflict might take; and what implications the findings have for the U.S. government at large, the joint force, and the Department of the Air Force in particular. This research was completed in September 2021, just after the Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan and before the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. The report has not been subsequently revised.

Key Findings

  • Potential for great-power competition in the Middle East converges on regional centers of economic and political power and states with historical relationships to the United States, Russia, or China.
  • The United States remains dominant in the military domain in the Middle East, but Russia and China are gaining ground.
  • Great-power involvement in potential future Middle Eastern conflicts is unlikely to be driven primarily by concerns over competitors' expanding influence.
  • Counterterrorism and great-power competition are interconnected in the Middle East.
  • Shifts in the level of U.S. engagement in the Middle East might contribute to conditions that lead to great-power involvement in proxy conflict.
  • The United States, China, and Russia have limited willingness for direct military engagement in the region unless there are direct threats to their core interests.
  • Conflicts in the Middle East involving great powers may not resemble those of the Cold War.

Recommendations

  • Recognize that U.S. interests in the Middle East require a long-term vision for the region.
  • Maintain or cultivate ties to friendly governments and non-state actors.
  • Rethink arms sales to the Middle East through the lens of great-power competition.
  • Maintain counterterrorism capabilities while cultivating capabilities relevant to other aspects of great-power competition.
  • Consider maintaining force presence in the Middle East to maintain stability and protect U.S. interests.
  • Maintain access agreements in the region, especially for overflight rights.
  • Prepare for continued demand for U.S. Air Force assets in the theater and invest accordingly.
  • Prepare for multifaceted deconfliction challenges in future conflicts that may involve China and Russia.

Table of Contents

  • Chapter One

    Introduction

  • Chapter Two

    Identifying Regional Competition Flashpoints

  • Chapter Three

    Conflict Scenarios with Great-Power Involvement: Afghanistan and Pakistan

  • Chapter Four

    Conflict Scenarios with Great-Power Involvement: Iraq

  • Chapter Five

    Conclusion

  • Appendix

    Details on the Competition-Potential and Conflict-Potential Indices

Research conducted by

The research reported here was commissioned by Headquarters Air Force A5S and conducted within the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND Project AIR FORCE.

This report is part of the RAND Corporation Research report series. RAND reports present research findings and objective analysis that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND reports undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity.

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to this product page is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.