This report — part of a four-volume series — explores where and how the United States, China, and Russia are competing for influence in Latin America; what kinds of interests they have in the continent; where and why competition might turn into conflict; what form that conflict might take; and the implications for the United States, particularly the Department of the Air Force.

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Great-Power Competition and Conflict in Latin America

by Irina A. Chindea, Elina Treyger, Raphael S. Cohen, Christian Curriden, Kurt Klein, Carlos Sanchez, Holly Gramkow, Khrystyna Holynska

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Research Questions

  1. Where and how are the United States, China, and Russia competing for influence in Latin America?
  2. What interests do they have in Latin America, and what is the relative potential for great-power competition in the region?
  3. Under what conditions could the United States expect to become involved in a conflict in Latin America in which China, Russia, or both are involved, and what form might that conflict take?
  4. What are the implications for the U.S. government, the Department of Defense, and the Department of the Air Force in particular?

In recent years, the United States has shifted its strategic focus from countering terrorism to countering China and Russia in the Indo-Pacific and Europe. Although Latin America has been a relatively neglected area in U.S. foreign policy in recent decades, it is a region of geostrategic importance for the United States. Increasingly, the region is also of interest to U.S. competitors: Both China and Russia have turned their attention toward Latin America in the past two decades, during which China has made economic and diplomatic inroads and Russia has increased its diplomatic and military presence. This report — part of a four-volume series — explores where and how the United States, China, and Russia are competing for influence in Latin America; what kinds of interests they have in the continent; what kinds of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic influence-seeking measures they are using; where and why competition might turn into conflict; what form that conflict might take; and what implications the findings have for the U.S. government at large, the Department of Defense, and the Department of the Air Force in particular. This research was completed in September 2021, before the November 2021 presidential elections in Nicaragua; Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine; and the October 2022 release of the unclassified versions of the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, the Nuclear Posture Review, and the Missile Defense Review. The report has not been subsequently revised.

Key Findings

  • The potential for great-power competition in Latin America converges on the most populous and economically developed countries in the region.
  • Among the three competitors, the United States retains the lead in most domains of national power in the region, but China is making significant advances.
  • Although China's influence-seeking is growing most significantly, the most-plausible conflict scenarios with great-power involvement that we examined involve Russia more than China, at least in the near term.
  • The potential for the three competitors' involvement in Latin American conflicts is driven primarily by geopolitical concerns rather than economic and security-related ones.
  • A reduction in the level of U.S. engagement in Latin America could create conditions that intensify strategic competition.
  • The United States, China, and Russia have limited appetites for conventional military engagement in the region, but the United States is the most likely competitor to become engaged and sustain support for proxies because it has higher stakes in Latin America than its rivals do.
  • In the conflict scenarios that we examined, the United States and its competitors could plausibly back opposing sides, in dynamics reminiscent of the Cold War.

Recommendations

  • Acknowledge the strategic importance of Latin America and design a strategy for the region based on a long-term vision that promotes sustained engagement with local partners and allies.
  • Better resource DoD and U.S. Department of State offices, as well as other U.S. government agencies that work in Latin America, to sustain competitive efforts across diplomatic, informational, military, and economic activities.
  • Increase engagement with countries throughout the entire region while prioritizing those with the highest competition potential.
  • Closely monitor the region to identify and prepare to respond to a variety of potentially emerging threats, especially in countries, such as Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, that are traditionally hostile to the United States.
  • Maintain cooperation and capabilities related to counternarcotics and migration while developing capabilities and security relations to support success in great-power competition.
  • Strengthen security cooperation with existing key partners and allies in Latin America and try to engage with less friendly governments where possible to maintain access in the region and limit competitors' influence.
  • Prepare to identify Chinese dual-use assets in the region and be ready to deter or deny their use for military purposes.
  • Maintain and develop military access agreements and overflight rights with the countries in the region.
  • Prepare for increased demand for U.S. Air Force assets in the theater and train and invest accordingly in developing the capabilities needed for victory.

Table of Contents

  • Chapter One

    Introduction

  • Chapter Two

    Identifying Regional Competition Flashpoints

  • Chapter Three

    Conflict Scenarios with Great-Power Involvement: Venezuela and Colombia

  • Chapter Four

    Conflict Scenario with Great-Power Involvement: Nicaragua

  • Chapter Five

    Conclusion

  • Appendix

    Details on the Competition-Potential and Conflict-Potential Indices

Research conducted by

The research reported here was commissioned by Headquarters Air Force A5S and conducted within the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND Project AIR FORCE.

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